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short- and long-term effects. 
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Introduction  
Symbolic management has been at the center of a growing literature in the strategic field. 
Extant research has studied the importance of symbolic actions as means to obtaining 
organizational legitimacy, including topics like long-term incentives in executive pay 
(Westphal and Zajac, 1994), stock repurchase (Westphal and Zajac, 2001), adoption of ethics 
codes (Stevens, Steensma, Harrison, and Cochran, 2005), entrepreneurship (Zott and Huy, 2007), 
and corporate social responsibility (David, Bloom, and Hillman, 2007; Weaver, Treviño, and 
Cochran, 1999). The common denominator across these studies is that symbolic policies 
decoupled from actual implementation represent a strategy that allows firms to alter the public 
perception of their legitimacy and enhance social acceptance. 
Despite the merit of previous studies, there are important questions that remain unanswered 
regarding the use and effectiveness of symbolic procedures in enhancing legitimacy. First, while 
pressures come from a variety of stakeholders, the literature has not addressed whether 
symbolic actions have distinctive effects depending on the target audience towards which these 
actions are oriented. However, a wide variety of stakeholders routinely assess a firm’s 
legitimacy, and thus individual contributions from these groups deserve attention (Bansal and 
Clelland, 2004). Second, symbolic actions have been traditionally analyzed as decoupled from 
substantive actions and thus treated as an “either/or” type of question. However, the combined 
effect of both on organizational legitimacy has been largely neglected. Third, most extant 
studies analyzed the impact of symbolic actions cross-sectionally, and consequently assumed 
that these actions have immediate results. But little is known about the endurance of symbolism 
in longer horizons. 
To address the three aforementioned gaps in the literature, this article focuses on environmental 
issues. Given the public concern about the natural environment, companies appear eager to 
associate themselves with the environment in order to preserve their reputations and further 
shape public image. In this context, some companies adopt “greenwashing” policies, while 
others embark upon more substantive environmental endeavors, offering the proper terrain to 
test the importance of both symbolic and substantive actions. 
Drawing on notions of institutional theory, and using insights from stakeholder theory and 
impression management, we claim that (1) attending the claims of different stakeholders can 
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have an impact environmental legitimacy (i.e., distinctive effect); (2) the combination of both 
symbolic and substantive actions has a greater impact on environmental legitimacy (i.e., 
combined effect); and (3) symbolic environmental actions have only short-term impact on 
environmental legitimacy, while substantive actions have both short- and long-term effects 
(i.e., horizon effect). We test our hypotheses using a longitudinal sample of 167 firms from 
polluting industries and analyze the impact on environmental legitimacy of their symbolic 
actions (participation in voluntary environmental programs sponsored by the government, 
green trademarks, environmental dedicated board committees, environmental pay policies and 
community communication) as well as their substantive initiatives (environmental patents and 
pollution prevention practices). 
   
Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses 
Institutional theory (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Scott, 1995, 2005) 
focuses on the role of social stimuli in shaping an organization’s actions. According to this 
perspective, when companies adopt strategies in adherence to institutional prescriptions, they 
reflect an alignment of corporate and societal values (Meyer and Rowan, 1977) and obtain 
external validation or legitimacy (Scott, 1995). Legitimacy, in turn, sustains organizational 
operability and enables the firm to compete more effectively as it allows better access to 
resources, attracts better employees, and improves the exchange conditions with partners 
(Aldrich and Fiol, 1994; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Oliver, 1991; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; 
Turban and Greening, 1997). As such, the acquisition of legitimacy is a strategic concern for 
organizations (Deephouse, 1999; Scott, 1995). 
Legitimacy refers to the degree to which actions by organizations in a given field are accepted 
as appropriate and useful by the broader public (Scott, 1995; Schuman, 1995). Legitimacy is 
conferred when stakeholders – those who affect and are affected by the firm’s actions (Freeman, 
1984) – endorse and support organizational actions. In line with institutional theory, a key 
premise of the stakeholder management perspective is that satisfied stakeholders grant it social 
legitimacy (Wood, 1991) and thus secure the firm’s long-term survival and success (Freeman, 
1984; Freeman and McVea, 2001; Hillman and Keim, 2001).  
Environmental legitimacy is obtained when firms successfully respond to pressures streaming 
from different actors that establish norms and common beliefs (Hoffman, 1999; Wade-Benzoni, 
Hoffman, Thompson, Moore, Gillespie, and Bazerman, 2002), often towards the avoidance of 
environmental misconduct (Berrone and Gomez-Mejia, 2009). When firms manage to conform to 
stakeholders’ environmental expectations, stakeholders grant legitimacy to the firms and they 
gain reputational capital (Bansal and Clelland, 2004; Fombrun, 1996; Godfrey, 2005; Hart, 1995). 
Conversely, poor environmental performance endangers social legitimacy and seriously hinders 
corporate prestige (Bansal and Clelland, 2004; Fombrun, 1996; Hart, 1995). As Wood (1991, 
p. 697) argues, when “stakeholders lose confidence in the firm’s performance, legitimacy may be 
withdrawn as the stakeholders refuse to provide their share of reciprocal benefits. Customers stop 
buying products, shareholders sell their stock, employees withhold loyalty and best efforts, 
government halts subsidies or imposes fines or regulates, environmental advocates sue. If the firm 
cannot compensate for lost stakeholder benefits, it becomes ‘illegitimate’ and dies.” 
Using this notion as a central argument, environmental management research has long 
established the importance of different interest groups regarding environmental claims and as 
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sources of environmental legitimacy (Berry and Rondinelli, 1998; Buysse and Verbeke, 2003; 
Henriques and Sadorsky, 1996, 1999; Kassinis and Vafeas, 2006). For instance, Henriques and 
Sadorsky (1996) found empirical evidence indicating that a firm’s formulation of an 
environmental plan was positively influenced by pressures from customers, shareholders, 
community groups, and the government. Along similar lines, Alvarez-Gil et al. (2007) found that 
communities, customers, employees, and the government influence the adoption of recycling and 
other reverse logistics programs. Similarly, Kassinis and Vafeas (2006) documented a positive 
relationship between community stakeholder pressures and environmental performance at 
the plant level. More recently, Murrillo-Luna, Garcés-Ayerbe, and Rivera-Torres (2008) studied the 
influence of different stakeholders on environmental strategies. 
In response to the environmental pressures from stakeholders, firms may adopt a variety of 
practices and policies in order to obtain societal approval. These practices can be generally 
classified as symbolic or substantive. 
Symbolic Actions 
Institutional theory suggests that “the appearance rather than the fact of conformity is often 
presumed to be sufficient for the attainment of legitimacy” (Oliver, 1991, p. 155). Under this 
view, symbolic actions are effective responses to external claims since firms need to gain 
legitimacy by conforming with norms sanctioned by stakeholders, but also face pressures to 
maintain internal flexibility (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). As a result, firms and their managers 
may favor symbolic rather than substantive practices (Suchman, 1995). Prior studies show that 
symbolic actions are not uncommon. For instance, there is evidence that managers satisfy 
shareholder demands by adopting but not implementing new governance structures (Westphal 
and Zajac, 1994; Zajac and Westphal, 1995). 
The final goal of symbolism is to influence societal perceptions of the company by using more 
visual actions in order to obtain a benefit (i.e., legitimacy). This is consistent with the field of 
study known as impression management. While essentially being a theory applied to 
individuals, impression management has been applied extensively to organizations, particularly 
to explain the reactions of firms facing legitimacy threats (Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990; Elsbach, 
1994; Elsbach and Sutton, 1992). 
In the context of environmental issues, impression management actions in the form of  
symbolic responses decoupled from core processes can be used as responses to legitimacy 
threats (Elsbach, 1994; Elsbach and Sutton, 1992) since impressionist citizenship behaviors 
contribute to legitimacy enhancement (Bolino, 1999). That is, given that environmental 
symbolic actions “‘provide cover’ for poor emissions performance by appearing to take steps in 
the right direction” (Russo and Harrison, 2005: 588), firms may acquire environmental 
legitimacy, recognizing the importance of good environmental performance for stakeholders, by 
focusing on actions that are easiest to observe. 
Social and environmental claims may come from both external and internal constituencies 
(Weaver et al., 1999). Prior research has identified five general groups that demand that firms 
protect the natural environment: government, communities, shareholders, customers, and 
employees (Alvarez-Gil et al., 2007; Henriques and Sadorsky, 1996, 1999). We focus on how 
symbolic environmental actions towards these groups can influence environmental legitimacy. 
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Government. Regulatory bodies like the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) are major 
constituencies linked to environmental issues. These agencies establish regulations and control 
enforcement mechanisms such as penalties, fines and the ability to pursue legal prosecution of 
violators. They also establish voluntary programs which seek corporate commitment to actions 
that improve the natural environment (see Darnall and Sides, 2008 for a recent meta-analysis 
on the issue).  
One way firms may signal their commitment to the environmental stance of governments is by 
participating in these environmental programs sponsored by agencies like the EPA. While these 
programs are intended to provide specialized information, technical assistance, and ultimately 
reduce pollution, they can be largely symbolic. Indeed, costs associated with membership are in 
many cases negligible (Delmas and Keller, 2005), and previous works have shown that poorly-
performing firms are likely to be engaged in voluntary programs (King and Lenox, 2000; 
Klassen and Whybark, 1999). In addition, there are no penalties in the case of not reporting 
environmental achievements, and participants can publicize their membership, regardless of 
their environmental record. Firms can enter voluntary programs not only to communicate their 
previous environmental initiatives in an effort to get governmental recognition (King, Lenox 
and Terlaak, 2006) but also as a vehicle for interacting with governmental officials, and they 
can try to obtain an “insurance” against risks such as claims for negligence and costly 
regulatory sanctions (Delmas and Keller, 2005). Given that participating firms send a “signal” 
that they are proactive in their environmental management, government may consider them 
greener and cleaner than non-participants. As a result, we expect that firm membership in 
environmental programs will benefit the firm in terms of governmental acceptance and thus 
increase the firm’s legitimacy.  
 
Hypothesis 1a: Participation in voluntary environmental programs sponsored by governmental 
agencies has a positive effect on environmental legitimacy. 
Community. Communities can be very active in demanding that companies protect the natural 
environment. Community pressures toward the conservation of the natural environment can 
take different forms such as non-profit organizations, local groups of neighbors or social 
activists. Environmental management research (Alvarez-Gil et al., 2007; Henriques and 
Sadorsky, 1996, 1999)  has documented the relevance of neighborhoods and community groups 
in the firms’ formulation of their environmental stance.  
To alleviate social monitoring and public scrutiny, companies can disclose their green stance to 
the general public through intense efforts in environmental communication. That is, firms try to 
project an image of “good corporate neighbor” by publicizing that they are transparent and 
socially responsible (e.g., green and protect the environment). Extant studies (Hooghiemstra, 
2000; Patten, 1992) showed that companies operating in an industry that experienced a major 
social incident felt their social acceptance threatened, and responded by increasing their 
coverage of environmental issues in annual reports. In this way, firms issue formal 
communications to manage public opinion, to respond to public pressure, and to react to 
perceived public perception about their legitimacy. While these communications may be largely 
decoupled from the actual implementation of social actions (Stevens et al., 2005; Weaver et al., 
1999), the community may give the “benefit of the doubt” to these firms regarding their 
environmental behavior. Thus, we expect the following.  
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Hypothesis 1b: Formal reporting procedures have a positive effect on environmental legitimacy. 
Shareholders. A group with growing influence on environmental issues of firms is the shareholders. 
Increasingly investors care about the social conduct of firms, and there has been a dramatic rise in 
the number and assets of socially screened mutual funds and indexes such as Domini 400, Dow 
Jones Sustainability Indexes and FTSE4Good Index. According to a recent report on SRI (Social 
Investment Forum, 2007), assets in socially screened portfolios climbed to $2.71 trillion in 2007, an 
increase from $2.16 trillion in 2003. Consequently, socially conscious investors are claiming better 
representation of their social interests within firms (David et al., 2007). 
Traditional studies in governance (Eisenhardt, 1989; Fama and Jensen, 1983) indicate that 
shareholders are represented by the board of directors. The board of directors’ main function is to 
monitor managers to protect shareholders’ interests, including those with social content (Greening 
and Gray, 1994; Kassinis and Vafeas, 2002). Board committees, smaller subgroups than the board 
overall, are an important mechanism because they keep specific issues at the top of the corporate 
agenda. Companies sometimes explicitly and formally delegate environmental oversight 
responsibilities to a subgroup of the board (that is, an environmental committee). Presumably, an 
environmental committee may provide resources to firms by drawing on the expertise of directors, 
and the board is in a better position to assess the firm’s performance on the environmental 
dimension. Yet some scholars expressed their reservations about the actual effectiveness of 
dedicated environmental committees (Berrone and Gómez-Mejía, 2009), indicating that a board 
with environmental oversight is only a signal to investors that the firm will adequately address 
environmental issues (Walls, Phan, and Berrone, 2007) and that a negative impact of an 
environmental mishap is unlikely, which may be enough for investors to assume that the firm is on 
the right path (Berrone, Surroca, and Tribo, 2007). Thus, we expect the following.  
 
Hypothesis 1c: The presence of a dedicated environmental board committee has a positive effect 
on environmental legitimacy. 
Customers. Consumers can be particularly vocal about the environmental footprint of the 
products they consume (Polonsky, 1995; Vandermerwe and Oliff, 1990). A 2007 McKinsey 
survey of 7,751 people found that 87% of consumers worry about the environmental and social 
impact of the products they buy (Bonini and Oppenheim, 2008). This suggests that consumers 
expect that the products they use perform effectively without unnecessarily harming the 
environment. Otherwise, they may boycott the companies (e.g., stop buying tuna caught in drift 
nets). Firms may respond to these pressures with ingratiation actions such as the adoption of 
green brands and trademarks, which ‘profess’ an environmental stance every time consumers 
look at the product. This is often portrayed by changing the name or label of a product and 
including the word “green” in the product’s name, for instance, to give the feeling of nature 
and project to consumers the image of environmentally preferable products. While there is little 
research on the extent to which green brands and labels are actually authentic, consumer 
ombudsmen and related associations like TerraChoice and EnviroMedia Social Marketing 
suggest that green brands may not necessarily mean green companies. Still, consumers may 
prefer to buy products from companies that claim to offer products that are environmentally 
responsible as they are seen as trustable and valuable (Thøgersen, 1999). Thus, we expect that:   
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Hypothesis 1d: Green trademarks have a positive effect on environmental legitimacy. 
Employees. Pressure for good environmental performance may also come from groups inside 
the firm (Polonsky, 1995). More and more employees prefer to work for companies that are 
socially responsible. They show greater commitment and harder work if the companies they 
work for have their social goals aligned (Turban and Greening, 1997). In addition, if a company 
is to adopt an environmentally-aware approach to its activities, the employees are the key to 
success or failure (Wehrmeyer, 1996). 
One way companies show their employees that they are committed to environmental issues is 
by formulating policies that include environmental criteria as a measure of employees’ efforts, 
recognize the value of good environmental performance and assume a commitment with their 
staff to steadily reward it (Berrone and Gómez-Mejía, 2009; Russo and Harrison, 2005). A 
formal tie between environmental performance and employees’ pay may help focus employees’ 
efforts on environment-related activities (Lothe, Myrtveit, and Trapani, 1999). Still, recent 
research (Berrone and Gómez-Mejía, 2009; Russo and Harrison, 2005) has showed that 
environmental performance is not necessarily enhanced when there is a formal link between 
pay and environmental criteria. This practice however allows firms to send a positive signal to 
their employees regarding the relatively-higher importance of environmental issues than in 
firms that adopt a less formal stance, and this will presumably be valued by employees (Turban 
and Greening, 1997). Therefore, we expect that:  
 
Hypothesis 1d: The adoption of environmental pay policies has a positive effect on environmental 
legitimacy. 
Substantive Actions 
Some institutional authors (Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990; Staw and Epstein, 2000; Suchman, 1995) 
have argued that exceeding minimum requirements may also confer legitimacy, so that “once 
minimal standards are met, corporations are likely to continue working… to be the best or the 
most admired” (Staw and Epstein, 2000, p. 526) and that the firm’s constituents prefer more 
substantive responses (Suchman, 1995). 
In terms of the environment, substantive actions often require significant changes in core 
practices, and entail certain risks, which should culminate in real improvements in the firm’s 
subsequent environmental performance and ultimately increase the firm’s environmental 
legitimacy. The environmental management literature has identified at least two substantive 
environmental practices: pollution prevention strategies and environmental innovation.  
Pollution prevention (PP). Pollution prevention strategies are intended to minimize or eliminate 
the creation of toxic chemical agents during the various stages of production (Christmann, 2000; 
Hart, 1995; Klassen and Whybark, 1999; Russo and Fouts, 1997; Sarkis and Cordeiro, 2001). 
Research has shown that PP efforts provide organizations with unique advantages (Christmann, 
2000; Hart, 1995; Klassen and Whybark, 1999; Russo and Fouts, 1997). 
PP strategies require structural investments in cleaner technologies (Klassen and Whybark, 1999; 
Russo and Fouts, 1997). At the same time, PP strategies are complex and risky. They are 
technologically complex because they require changes in systems, processes, and products 
(Aragon-Correa and Sharma, 2003); socially complex because they involve diverse stakeholders at 
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different levels (Russo and Fouts, 1997); and structurally complex because they require 
managerial commitment and cross-functional coordination (Aragon-Correa, 1998). Yet given that 
PP strategies reduce and eliminate waste generation, they can potentially satisfy the 
environmental claims of all stakeholders which will in turn grant legitimacy to firms. 
 
Hypothesis 2a: Evidence of pollution prevention strategies has a positive effect on environmental 
legitimacy. 
Environmental innovation (EI). Some firms may see the opportunity to generate profits from 
resources and capabilities because of imperfectly competitive strategic factor markets (Barney, 
1991; Teece, Pisano, and Shuen, 1997) created by the ambiguity of the meaning and impact of 
environmental development (Bansal, 2005). Pressures for the conservation of the environment 
may spawn innovations as they may be the path for organizations to become unique and 
sufficiently different to avoid competitors’ imitation (Barney, Wright, and Ketchen, 2001; Peteraf, 
1993). Yet, by definition, innovative activities are inherently risky as they provide greater 
variability of outcomes and greater probability of failure (Baysinger, Kosnik, and Turk, 1991). 
Also, innovative endeavors require long-term investments (Hoskisson, Hitt, and Hill, 1993). 
Consequently, innovation requires substantive commitments in terms of resources and time. At 
the same time, environmental related innovations are intended to reduce the toxic burden of 
production processes and therefore respond adequately to the stakeholders’ claims regarding the 
natural environment. Thus, by engaging in environmental innovations, firms can successfully 
conform to social demands while searching for competitive advantage (Berrone, Gelabert, Fosfuri, 
and Gómez-Mejía, 2008). 
 
Hypothesis 2b: Environmental related patents have a positive effect on environmental legitimacy.  
Combined Effect 
In the previous paragraphs we claim that both symbolic and substantive environmental actions 
can have a positive impact on environmental legitimacy. Therefore, it is reasonable to expect 
that when both actions are joined the result will be greater legitimacy. This is so because 
decoupling symbolic from substantive environmental actions within polluting industries may 
represent a dangerous strategy for firms as their legitimacy is placed at risk. In this sense, King, 
Lenox, and Terlaak (2005) argued that if environmental certifications are not coupled with the 
actual implementation of the prescribed practices, firms may not be able to provide credible 
information to their buyers and sellers about their environmental stance, which increases 
information asymmetries and their subsequent drawbacks. Moreover, gross deviations from that 
policy would be perceived as hypocritical. If symbolic actions are decoupled from substantive 
actions and this dissonance is exposed to the public, companies relying exclusively on symbolic 
environmental actions may be seen as untruthful, unreliable, calculating, and manipulative, 
resulting in lower legitimacy. 
In addition, precisely because symbolic actions may be more visible than substantive actions, 
they may be seen as “cosmetic” or opportunistic (King and Lenox, 2000). Achieving legitimacy 
exclusively with “symbolic” strategies, however, may be more difficult in a strong institutional 
field such as the one regarding pollution, where objective measures are made public and 
institutional pressures are steady (Berrone and Gómez-Mejía, 2009). But if symbolic actions are 
accompanied by consistent substantive initiatives, the effect on legitimacy should be higher.  
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H3: Symbolic environmental actions will have greater impact on environmental legitimacy if 
coupled with substantive environmental actions. 
Time Horizon 
A key assumption of symbolism management is that impression management practices like 
messages and signals may suffice to obtain legitimacy from stakeholders. That is, stakeholders 
do not go through the actual verification of the firm’s claims; rather, they naively believe all 
that the firms claim. While this may be true in the short term, it might not be the case in the 
long haul. Several reasons may support this. First, as time passes, there are more chances for 
stakeholders to realize if there are dissonances between organizational actions and societal 
requirements (Milstein, Hart, and York, 2002). Second, symbolic environmental actions are 
presumably more visual, cheaper, and easier to implement than substantive actions, and thus 
are more easily copied. Consequently, symbolic actions will have more limited impact on 
legitimacy. Conversely, substantive environmental endeavors, as explained in the previous 
section, posses the ability to become organizational capabilities and as such are more difficult 
to imitate, having more enduring effect on legitimacy. 
 
H4a: Symbolic environmental actions will only have a positive impact on environmental 
legitimacy in the short term. 
H4b: Substantive environmental actions will a positive impact on environmental legitimacy in 
both the short and long term. 
Methods 
Sample and Data Collection 
Data on an institutional field should represent firms facing similar institutional pressures 
(Hoffman, 2001). Consistent with prior research (Berrone and Gómez-Mejía, 2009; Russo and 
Harrison, 2005), we chose to focus on firms from industries subject to reporting under the 
“Toxic Release Inventory” program of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), which 
requires facilities exceeding a threshold level to report their emissions. These firms are all 
subject to the same regulatory framework and arguably face similar media attention, scrutiny 
from activists, community concerns, and changes in consumer preferences (Berrone and 
Gómez-Mejía, 2009).  
We collected information from different sources to construct the database. We started 
identifying firms belonging to the 20 most polluting sectors according to the EPA’s TRI (Toxic 
Release Inventory) program.1  Then we cross referenced this initial sample with the KLD and 
Compustat database and searched for data from other data sources to get information on all the 
remaining independent variables as we describe in the next section. The final sample after 
dropping firms with missing values is an unbalanced panel of 167 firms between 1997 and 
2002.  
                                              
1 The 20 most polluting U.S. sectors for the analyzed period at the two-digit SIC code are: 10, 50, 33, 49, 28, 36, 12, 13, 20, 32, 
30, 51, 26, 34, 29, 31, 35, 37, 24, 27. 
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Measures 
Dependent Variable 
Environmental legitimacy. Following previous empirical literature (Bansal and Clelland, 2004; 
Hamilton, 1995; Konar and Cohen, 1997), we drew on media accounts to assess environmental 
legitimacy. We used The Wall Street Journal as the media source, given its national coverage and 
its importance as a communication medium. We relied on this journal as the single source in order 
to avoid duplication of news, since our measure of environmental legitimacy is sensitive to the 
number of articles. We followed the next steps to compute the measure of environmental 
legitimacy: First we extracted the full text electronic articles including the company name and at 
least one of the keywords from an environmental words list between 1996 and 2002. The keywords 
included are those used by Bansal and Clelland (2004) (“sustainable development,” “environment,” 
“pollution,” and “toxic”) and others added from papers cited in that article (“hazardous,” “waste,” 
“disposal,” “alternative energy,” “ecology,” and “contamination”). We obtained over 1500 articles 
for the period under analysis. Second we read each of the articles, identified the relevant stories and 
coded them as “-1”, “0” or “1” depending on whether they reflected a “negative”, “neutral” or 
“positive” contribution to the firm’s environmental legitimacy. The coding was performed by two of 
the authors. We performed an intercoder reliability check for 100 randomly selected articles. The 
two raters agreed on 91% of the cases suggesting a high level of reliability (Weber, 1991). Since the 
disagreements had mostly to do with the use of the neutral category, we dropped those articles 
classified as neutral to reduce unreliable coding. Finally, following Deephouse (1996) and Bansal 
and Cleelland (2004), we used the Janis-Fadner coefficient (see Appendix 1) to construct our 
measure of environmental legitimacy. The measure ranges from 1 (when there is a high presence of 
favorable articles) to -1 (when there is a high presence of unfavorable articles).  
Independent Variables and Controls 
 
a) Symbolic actions 
Voluntary government programs. In the United States alone there are over 200 of this type of 
program (Darnall and Carmin, 2005). Variety among these programs is large, with some of them 
oriented exclusively to specific sectors or topics, or limited in time or restricted in terms of 
participation. For our purpose, we needed voluntary participation in a broad program. 
Following Delmas and Keller, (2005), we use the case of the United States, Environmental 
Protection Agency’s (EPA’s) WasteWise program2 in order to estimate the effect of participation 
in these types of initiatives on environmental legitimacy. This program was originally 
established by the EPA to reduce municipal solid waste, covers the period under analysis, is 
open to a broad set of industries, and sets little requirements for participation. The variable 
takes the value of “1” if the firm participates in the WasteWise program and “0” otherwise. This 
information was generously provided by a representative of the EPA’s WasteWise Program. 
Community communication. In order to measure the firm’s level of communication with the 
community concerning its environmental behavior, we drew on the KLD database which has 
been frequently used in the empirical social literature (Graves and Waddock, 1994; Johnson 
and Greening, 1999; McWilliams and Siegel, 2000; Neubaum and Zahra, 2006; Waddock and 
                                              
2 See Delmas and Keller (2005) for a complete description of the program. 
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Graves, 1997). More precisely, we used the fifth question about strengths in the “Environment” 
section, which is labeled as “Communications” (ENV.str-E). The variable takes the value of “1” 
if the firm is signatory to the CERES Principles, publishes a notable substantive environmental 
report or has notably effective internal communications systems in place for environmental 
best practices, and “0” otherwise. 
Environmental-dedicated board committee. We used a measure constructed by Berrone and 
Gomez-Mejia (2009) to identify those firms that had an environmental–dedicated committee on 
the board. To determine whether the firm had an environmental-dedicated board committee 
they analyzed annual proxy statements searching for dyadic relationships between the items in 
an environmental wordlist (the wordlist we used to compute our measure of environmental 
legitimacy) and the word “committee”. The paragraphs extracted were individually inspected to 
determine whether or not the company had a committee responsible for environmental issues. 
Finally, the variable takes the value of “1” if the firm had a board committee responsible for 
environmental issues, and “0” otherwise. 
Environmental trademarks. We obtained total environmental trademarks registered at the United 
States Patents and Trademarks Office for each of the firms in the sample for the period under 
analysis. We proceeded by extracting for our sampled firms all the registered trademarks 
including in its description at least one of the following keywords: “alternative energy,” “clean,” 
“Earth,” “eco,” “ecology,” “environment,” “friendly,” “green,” “natural,” “organic,” “planet” and 
“sustainable.” In order to refine the search, we included words with suffixes and prefixes (e.g., 
ecology, ecologic, ecological). The variable was defined as the total number of environmental 
trademarks registered in a particular year. For our timeframe there were no firms with more than 
one environmental trademark in a given year. So the variable takes the value “0” or “1.” 
Environmental pay-policies. We used a measure constructed by Berrone and Gómez-Mejía 
(2009) to identify those firms with an explicit environmental pay-policy. To define whether the 
firm has established an explicit pay policy they analyzed annual proxy statements searching for 
paragraphs that contained any word(s) from the environmental wordlist (the wordlist we used to 
compute our measure of environmental legitimacy) plus any word(s) from a pay wordlist. The pay 
wordlist included the terms “pay,” “compensation,” “salary,” “wage,” “reward,” “remuneration,” 
“incentives,” “bonus,” “stock,” and “income.” Finally, they visually inspected the texts and created 
a dummy variable that takes the value of “1” if there was at least one explicit relationship 
between executive pay and environmental performance in the firm’s annual proxy statement, and 
“0” otherwise. 
 
b) Substantive actions 
Pollution prevention. Following previous environmental literature (King and Lenox, 2000, 
2002), we measured pollution prevention strategies as the difference between a predicted value 
and some actual pollution level; more precisely, we use the measure computed by Berrone and 
Gómez-Mejía (2009). Given that facilities must report their production ratios for the current 
reporting year as compared to the previous reporting year (i.e., the ratio of the production 
volume in t+1 to the production volume in t), we used these values to estimate total waste 
generation and then compared them with real values. 3 In order to estimate waste generation we 
followed these next steps: First, we weighted each chemical by its Human Toxicity Potential 
Factor (HTP) developed by Hertwich et al. (2001), which measures toxicity in terms of benzene 
                                              
3 PR values often vary around 1. For instance, a ratio of 1.1 would indicate a 10% increase in production. 
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equivalence (for carcinogens) or toluene equivalence (for non-carcinogens); second, we 
aggregated the results across chemicals at facility level; third, we multiplied these results by 
their corresponding production ratio values; fourth, we aggregated results by parent company; 
and finally, we compared these results against real values (see Appendix 2 for an analytical 
description of this procedure). Since the HTP method offers cancer and non-cancer values, we 
calculated the formulas in Appendix 2 using these values separately and obtained two different 
measures of pollution prevention. Given the high skewness of these variables, we log-
transformed them to approach normality. Later, we calculated their reliability and, given their 
high Cronbach alpha score (α = 0.96), standardized and averaged both measures to create our 
final pollution prevention measure. 
Environmental innovation. We used patent data from the CHI’s Patent Citation Indicators 
database to measure environmental innovation. This database tracks information about 
environmental-related patents of firms with more than 40 patents in the last 5 years. This 
database represents more than 60% of all United States patents granted since 1992 and more than 
70% of those patents that are not held by private individuals. We gathered information provided 
by Nameroff et al. (2004) about company-assignees of over 3,200 environmental-related patents 
during 1983-2001 and the number of forward citations for each of these patents. 4 
A well known source of concern with the use of patent counts as a measure of innovation 
output is that it does not take into account that, while some patents are very valuable, others 
are worth almost nothing. Recognizing this problem, Lanjouw and Shankerman (1999) and 
Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg (2005) among others, have suggested the use of adjusted measures 
that use patent citations as a proxy of its quality. Along this line, we measured environmental 
innovation computing an index where patents are weighted by their corresponding citations 
(see Appendix 3). 
 
c) Controls 
Following Deephouse (1996), we further controlled for other potential determinants of 
environmental legitimacy such as size, age and financial performance. Larger firms may have 
more contractual and social ties and also endorsements from actors from their environments 
(Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Singh, 1986). Concerning age, older organizations are more likely 
to develop strong exchange relationships and be endorsed by powerful social actors (Hannan 
and Freeman, 1984; Singh, 1986). Additionally, firms with better financial performance are 
more efficient at producing goods and services, and society values such efficiency (Dowling and 
Pfeffer, 1975; Meyer and Rowan, 1977). We measured size by the logarithm of the total number 
of employees, we obtained the foundation year to compute the firm age, and we proxied 
financial performance using the annual return on assets (ROA). All three measures were 
obtained from Compustat database. We also included the firm level of emissions (over sales) as 
an additional control variable. Ceteris paribus, firms with higher emissions are expected to have 
lower environmental legitimacy. Finally, all the specifications include sector dummies at the 
two-digit SIC code and annual dummies. 
                                              
4 See Nameroff et al. (2004) for a more comprehensive description of the CHI Research Inc database. A full description of the 
patent search filter used to identify environmental patents is available at http://www.chemistry.org/greenchemistryinstitute.  
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Empirical Analysis 
Given that the dependent variable (Environmental legitimacy) is bounded between -1 and 1, and 
may have many observations in the boundaries, a Tobit model is appropriate. It is reasonable to 
think that firm fixed effects may explain part of the variation in our dependent variable so we 
want to include them as controls. However, when the number of periods of the panel is small, 
including firm fixed effects in nonlinear models may produce inconsistent estimates, the so called 
“incidental parameters” (as discussed in Neyman and Scott, 1948; Wooldridge, 2002). So we 
proceed by reporting first the estimations of the Tobit model with random effects and then report 
the results of estimating a linear model with random and fixed effects. 
Results 
Table 1 reports some descriptive statistics and correlations of the variables used in the analysis. 
The total number of firm/year observations is 667. The reported correlations do not raise any 
concern about possible multicollinearity. 
Table 2 shows the results of modeling environmental legitimacy as a function of substantive and 
symbolic contemporaneous (same year) actions and some time-varying controls. Columns (1) 
and (2) report the results of the pooled Tobit and Random Effects Tobit respectively. Columns (3) 
to (5) report the results of the pooled linear model and with random and fixed effects. 
Results of the Tobit and linear models are quite similar concerning the signs and significance 
of the coefficients (model 1 compared to model 3, and model 2 compared to model 4), 
suggesting that the estimation bias resulting from the positive probability of the upper and 
lower limits of the dependent variable do not appear to be very strong. As a result our preferred 
specification is always the linear model with fixed effects (column 5), since it controls for 
unobserved heterogeneity and, in addition, the Hausman test rejects the use of random effects 
in favor of fixed effects. 
We turn now to the basic findings. The use of environmental pay-policies and participation in 
voluntary government programs do not have a significant effect in our sample in any of the 
specifications. Concerning the other symbolic actions, according to the linear model with fixed 
effects (model 5), community communication has a significant positive effect supporting 
hypothesis 1b. Contrary to our expectation, the presence of an environmental committee has a 
significant negative effect on environmental legitimacy. Finally, although the coefficient of 
environmental trademarks is significant and positive for models 1 to 4 it is not significant for 
model 5, providing partial support for hypothesis 1d. Substantive actions have a positive and 
significant effect across all the specifications, providing strong support for hypotheses 2a and 2b. 
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
 
 Mean s.d. Min Max  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1. Environmental legitimacy 0.098 0.469 -1 1  1            
2. Environmental innovation 0.359 1.970 0 29.844  0.339 1           
3. Pollution prevention -0.419 1.254 -2.354 1  0.225 0.084 1          
4. Government programs 0.334 0.472 0 1  0.036 0.083 -0.028 1         
5. Community Communication 0.085 0.279 0 1  0.064 0.017 -0.032 0.033 1        
6. Environmental committee 0.119 0.325 0 1  0.095 0.067 -0.057 0.002 0.135 1       
7. Environmental trademarks 0.028 0.166 0 1  0.329 0.610 0.119 0.107 -0.020 0.047 1      
8. Environmental pay-policies 0.046 0.211 0 1  0.098 0.123 -0.032 0.054 0.034 0.269 0.176 1     
9. ROA 5.885 10.107 -80.244 42.626  0.118 0.110 -0.129 0.173 0.170 0.174 0.060 0.164 1    
10. Firm size 3.166 1.207 0.134 6.188  -0.034 -0.080 -0.072 0.008 -0.011 -0.014 -0.047 0.066 0.073 1   
11. Firm age 44.144 24.879 11 89  -0.079 -0.061 0.026 0.045 0.004 0.061 -0.024 -0.024 -0.206 -0.072 1  
12. Emissions over sales 3.118 2.483 0 8.901  0.025 0.019 -0.271 0.008 0.118 0.216 0.026 0.172 0.199 0.025 -0.061 1 
 
The total number of firm-year observations equals 667. 
 
 
 14 -  IESE Business School-University of Navarra 
 
 
Table 2 
Determinants of Environmental Legitimacy 
 
 Dependent Variable: Environmental Legitimacyt 
 Tobit 
(Pooled) 
(1) 
Tobit 
(Random effects) 
(2) 
 OLS 
(Pooled) 
(3) 
OLS 
(Random effects)
(4) 
OLS 
(Fixed effects) 
(5) 
Environmental 
innovationt 
0.136*** 
(0.022) 
0.110*** 
(0.021) 
0.041** 
(0.018) 
0.041*** 
(0.011) 
0.035*** 
(0.011) 
Pollution preventiont 0.104*** 
(0.016) 
0.090*** 
(0.015) 
0.084*** 
(0.013) 
0.076*** 
(0.013) 
0.064*** 
(0.014) 
Government 
programst 
0.028 
(0.068) 
-0.014 
(0.057) 
-0.010 
(0.037) 
-0.012 
(0.044) 
-0.067 
(0.120) 
Community 
Communicationt 
0.170** 
(0.077) 
0.200*** 
(0.090) 
0.132 
(0.089) 
0.015** 
(0.007) 
0.191* 
(0.104) 
Environmental 
committeet 
0.028 
(0.069) 
-0.022 
(0.075) 
0.029 
(0.071) 
0.011 
(0.060) 
-0.111* 
(0.052) 
Environmental 
trademarkst 
3.459*** 
(1.221) 
2.422** 
(1.836) 
0.448*** 
(0.117) 
0.363*** 
(0.136) 
-0.037 
(0.176) 
Environmental  
pay-policiest 
0.071 
(0.107) 
0.075 
(0.108) 
0.054 
(0.082) 
0.086 
(0.086) 
0.083 
(0.096) 
ROAt -0.002 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
Firm sizet 0.057*** 
(0.020) 
0.060*** 
(0.025) 
0.047*** 
(0.017) 
0.047** 
(0.019) 
0.017 
(0.079) 
Firm aget 0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.020 
(0.015) 
Emissions per salest 0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.011 
(0.011) 
0.002 
(0.008) 
-0.005 
(0.009) 
-0.069*** 
(0.020) 
Observations 
       Left censored 
       Right censored 
667 
43 
88 
667 
43 
88 
 667 667 667 
LR Chi2 (df) 246.43(34)*** 104.05(34)***     
R2     25.15% 24.83% 3.12% 
All models include sector (at the two digit SIC code) and annual dummies. Standard errors in parentheses.  All 
models include a constant term. 
 
In Table 3 we test for hypothesis 3. In order to test for the significance of the interaction 
between substantive and symbolic actions, we compute a single measure of each type of action.  
Each measure is defined as the total number of actions. In order to define a single measure of 
substantive actions we proceeded first to transform the two measures of substantive actions 
(environmental innovation and pollution prevention) into dummy variables. For environmental 
innovation we assigned the value 1 if the firm has a positive value of the citation weighted 
index and 0 otherwise. According to the formula developed in Appendix 1, this environmental 
innovation dummy variable will take the value 0 when the firm has no environmental patents 
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or when it has environmental patents without any citations. For pollution prevention, we 
assigned the value 1 if the firm had a pollution prevention level higher than the median, and 0 
otherwise. Next, we computed the sum of these two dummy measures to obtain a single 
measure of substantive actions. This measure can take the value 0, 1 or 2. Concerning symbolic 
actions, all the measures of each of the five symbolic actions are dummy variables, so in order 
to have a single measure we simply computed the sum. Table 3 shows the results of estimating 
the models with these two aggregated measures of substantive and symbolic actions and their 
interaction. Again results provided by the Tobit and linear models (model 1 compared to 
model 3, and model 2 compared to model 4) are quite similar in terms of significance and sign 
of the estimated coefficients  so we will describe the results of the last specification with firm 
fixed effects (model 5). While there is strong support for the positive effect of substantive 
actions on environmental legitimacy, the model suggest that symbolic actions have a 
significant positive effect only when they are accompanied by substantive actions, providing 
support for hypothesis 3. When there is no implementation of substantive actions then the 
effect of symbolic actions is not significant. Although for some of the models without firm 
fixed effects (models 1, 2 and 3) symbolic actions are significant and positive, we believe that 
these significant coefficients only reflect correlation rather than a causal relationship between 
implementing those actions and obtaining a benefit on environmental legitimacy. As we argued 
before, in order to test for the causal relationship we have more confidence in the specification 
with fixed effects (model 5) where the direct effect of symbolic actions is not significant. 
To finish in Table 4 we explore the long-term effect of symbolic and substantive actions, 
including a one-year lag of each of the actions considered in this analysis. For those symbolic 
actions that were significant in Table 2 (community communication and the existence of an 
environmental committee) we only find a short-term effect on environmental legitimacy, 
providing support for hypothesis 4a. Concerning substantive actions, both contemporaneous 
and one year lagged actions have a positive effect on environmental legitimacy, supporting 
hypothesis 4b.5 
Concerning the control variables, size is not significant in those specifications that include firm 
fixed effects (models 5) probably due to little variation in the number of employees within firms 
for the period under analysis. Neither performance nor age is significant in any of the 
specifications. Lastly, as expected, a marginal increase in the level of firm emissions with 
respect to total sales (in dollars) reduces the firm’s level of environmental legitimacy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                              
5 We also explored the long-term effect of symbolic and substantive actions using the aggregated measures defined to test 
hypothesis 3. The results from re-estimating models 1 to 5 using the contemporaneous and the one-year lagged indexes of 
substantive and symbolic actions show that while symbolic actions are not significant, substantive actions have a significant 
positive effect both in the short- and long-run. Results are available upon request.   
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Table 3 
Determinants of Environmental Legitimacy 
 
 Dependent Variable: Environmental Legitimacyt 
 Tobit 
(Pooled) 
(1) 
Tobit 
(Random effects) 
(2) 
OLS 
(Pooled) 
(3) 
OLS 
(Random effects) 
(4) 
OLS 
(Fixed effects) 
(5) 
Substantive Indext 0.155*** 
(0.027) 
0.167*** 
(0.028) 
0.162*** 
(0.022) 
0.158*** 
(0.021) 
0.193*** 
(0.026) 
Symbolic Indext 0.119*** 
(0.026) 
0.086* 
(0.051) 
0.037** 
(0.017) 
0.029 
(0.019) 
-0.043 
(0.026) 
Substantive Indext X 
Symbolic Indext 
0.171*** 
(0.028) 
0.132*** 
(0.028) 
0.057*** 
(0.013) 
0.054*** 
(0.016 
0.034** 
(0.013) 
ROAt -0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
Firm sizet 0.039** 
(0.017) 
0.051** 
(0.023) 
0.036** 
(0.016) 
0.042** 
(0.017) 
0.045 
(0.075) 
Firm aget -0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.020 
(0.014) 
Emissions per salest 0.017** 
(0.008) 
0.007 
(0.011) 
0.015** 
(0.007) 
0.011 
(0.008) 
-0.064*** 
(0.019) 
Observations 
       Left censored 
       Right censored 
667 
43 
88 
667 
43 
88 
667 667 667 
LR Chi2 (df) (7) 250.67*** (7)160.30***    
R2    27.45% 27.11% 4.95% 
All models include sector (at the two digit SIC code) and annual dummies. Standard errors in parentheses. 
All models include a constant term. All models include a constant term. 
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Table 4 
Determinants of Environmental Legitimacy 
 Dependent Variable: Environmental Legitimacyt 
 Tobit 
(Pooled) 
(1) 
Tobit 
(Random effects) 
(2) 
OLS 
(Pooled) 
(3) 
OLS 
(Random effects) 
(4) 
OLS 
(Fixed effects) 
(5) 
Environmental 
innovationt 
0.127*** 
(0.018) 
0.125*** 
(0.018) 
0.054*** 
(0.017) 
0.050*** 
(0.013) 
0.048*** 
(0.013) 
Environmental 
innovationt-1 
0.110*** 
(0.031) 
0.102*** 
(0.030) 
0.040*** 
(0.024) 
0.042*** 
(0.013) 
0.041*** 
(0.013) 
Pollution preventiont 0.025** 
(0.019) 
0.039** 
(0.019) 
0.075*** 
(0.018) 
0.083*** 
(0.018) 
0.078*** 
(0.016) 
Pollution preventiont-1 0.044*** 
(0.019) 
0.050*** 
(0.019) 
0.102*** 
(0.018) 
0.096*** 
(0.019) 
0.094*** 
(0.021) 
Government programst -0.087 
(0.078) 
0.006 
(0.016) 
0.137 
(0.142) 
0.092 
(0.144) 
-0.136 
(0.186) 
Government 
programst-1 
0.077 
(0.085) 
0.001 
(0.016) 
-0.145 
(0.145) 
0.111 
(0.144) 
-0.070 
(0.160) 
Community 
Communicationt 
0.172 
(0.129) 
0.199 
(0.123) 
0.214 
(0.240) 
0.229** 
(0.112) 
0.317*** 
(0.140) 
Community 
Communicationt-1 
-0.264** 
(0.171) 
-0.265** 
(0.124) 
-0.231 
(0.150) 
-0.213 
(0.180) 
-0.118 
(0.128) 
Environmental 
committeet 
-0.087 
(0.078) 
-0.087 
(0.078) 
0.027 
(0.091) 
0.014 
(0.069) 
-0.082* 
(0.049) 
Environmental 
committeet-1 
0.077 
(0.085) 
0.074 
(0.081) 
0.049 
(0.088) 
0.029 
(0.072) 
-0.038 
(0.084) 
Environmental 
trademarkst 
5.341 
(5.122) 
6.171 
(7.043) 
-0.436 
(0.272) 
-0.343 
(0.228) 
-0.476 
(0.374) 
Environmental 
trademarkst-1 
-5.028 
(6.765) 
-5.133 
(6.221) 
0.446*** 
(0.167) 
0.321* 
(0.172) 
0.087 
(0.190) 
Environmental pay-
policiest 
-0.073 
(0.062) 
-0.082 
(0.105) 
0.008 
(0.105) 
0.002 
(0.094) 
0.051 
(0.112) 
Environmental pay-
policiest-1 
0.062 
(0.132) 
0.099 
(0.125) 
-0.032 
(0.123) 
0.087 
(0.190) 
0.147 
(0.119) 
ROAt -0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
Firm sizet 0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.004 
(0.022) 
0.025 
(0.018) 
0.027 
(0.022) 
0.021 
(0.096) 
Firm aget 0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.023 
(0.023) 
Emissions per salest 0.004 
(0.008) 
0.006 
(0.010) 
0.018** 
(0.001) 
0.010 
(0.010) 
-0.071*** 
(0.022) 
Observations 
       Left censored 
       Right censored 
512 
37 
71 
512 
37 
71 
512 512 512 
LR Chi2 (df) 441.43(18)*** 74.02(18)***    
R2    27.39% 26.95% 9.75%  
All models include sector (at the two digit SIC code) and annual dummies. Standard errors in parentheses. All models include a 
constant term. 
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Robustness Checks 
We have run other models to verify the robustness of results. A potential concern with the 
reported results is that firms with no environmentally related articles were also included in 
the analysis. Notice that the Janis-Fadner coefficient assigns a value 0 when the number of 
positive articles equals the number of negative articles, but also when there are no positive 
or negative articles. However, we may suspect that The Wall Street Journal may have a certain 
bias in the type of firms they cover (perhaps towards bigger firms), and so the fact that for 
some firms there is no positive or negative news may not reflect the nonexistence of 
environmental events but the fact that some types of firms are not of interest for the journal. In 
order to check that the results are not driven by the behavior of firms with no environmentally 
related articles, we re-estimated all the models including only those firms that had at least one 
environmentally related article during the period under analysis. The number of firm/year 
observations drops from 667 to 445 but results are qualitatively unchanged; that is, the sign 
and significance of the coefficients of the main findings are not affected. We also analyzed 
whether results were sensitive to the use of other measures of the independent variables. An 
interesting finding has to do with the effect of environmental innovation. Results hold using 
other methods to compute a citation-weighted patent index, but the coefficient of environmental 
innovation becomes not significant if we simply use patent counts. All these results are available 
from the authors upon request. 
Discussion and Conclusions 
Society’s increasing concerns regarding the natural ecosystem is placing environmental 
management at the forefront of the corporate agenda. Companies make all sorts of efforts in terms 
of greener practices to “save face” and gain the approval of their stakeholders. However, results of 
the article suggest that not all environmental actions are effective in achieving social acceptance. 
As a consequence, our work has important implications for both research and practice. 
Implications for Research 
One important assumption in the institutional theory is that minimum compliance with 
stakeholders’ requirements is the optimal behavior to obtain legitimacy, since this allows firms 
to respond to external pressures while maintaining internal flexibility and control. However, 
our results debunk this assumption since just one of our symbolic measures (community 
communication) appeared to have a positive and significant effect on legitimacy while both of 
our substantive measures seemed to have enduring effect on legitimacy. Our work provides 
empirical evidence to the notion that, within strong institutional fields like polluting industries, 
it is extremely difficult to achieve legitimacy only through symbolic actions (Berrone and 
Gómez-Mejía, 2009). Our results are also consistent with the environmental management 
literature that suggests that the true value of environmental actions are in those actions that 
can effectively minimize or eliminate the creation of toxic chemical agents rather than those 
oriented towards compliance only (Christmann, 2000; Hart, 1995; Klassen and Whybark, 1999; 
Russo and Fouts, 1997; Sarkis and Cordeiro, 2001).  
Our work also has implications for symbolism and impression management research. While our 
results suggest that symbolic actions may not be sufficient to achieve legitimacy, they do not 
indicate that symbolic actions are not important. We showed that symbolic and substantive 
actions are actually complementary instead of supplementary, and that  they have a greater 
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impact on legitimacy when combined. Therefore, approaches that suggest decoupling as an 
effective strategy are here called into question. Theorists should refine their predictions 
involving ways to achieve and maintain legitimacy to recognize that there may be cases and 
contexts where symbolic actions in isolation are inadequate. 
Interestingly, our results suggested that, in some cases, symbolic actions may actually have 
deleterious effects on social acceptance like in the case of environmental dedicated committees. 
One way to explain this result is that society interprets the adoption of an environmental 
committee as a “too obvious” artifact to pretend to be green, and then penalizes the company 
by withdrawing legitimacy. We also showed that there are differences in terms of time horizon. 
Symbolic actions may only have a short-lived impact on legitimacy while more definitive 
responses like environmental innovation or pollution prevention strategies have positive 
influence in both the short- and long-term. An idealist may interpret this as supporting 
evidence that society has the ability to recognize those actions that have true value to the 
environment. 
We also enrich the legitimacy literature. While legitimacy is a central concept to which many 
studies anchored their theoretical underpinnings (Schuman, 1995), operationalization and 
empirical analysis of this construct is rather limited with a few notable exceptions (Bansal 
and Clelland, 2004; Deephouse, 1996; Higgins and Gulati, 2003). We shared with these studies the 
use of a legitimacy measure in our estimations. Unlike extant studies, however, our work is, to the 
best of our knowledge, the first one to systematically examine a variety of both symbolic and 
substantive actions as determinants of environmental legitimacy, showing what actions help to 
enhance it. In this way, we contributed to filling the gap in the literature regarding the limited 
understanding on what firms must do to acquire legitimacy (Zimmerman and Zeitz, 2002). 
Implications for Practice 
More and more organizations are jumping on the Green Management bandwagon but there is a 
wide variety in the way they do it. Perhaps the most important message for practitioners is that 
only genuinely green credentials are effective in acquiring social legitimacy. An environmental 
stance is difficult to fake, especially if your company is within an environmentally-sensitive 
sector. Prior research indicates that managers may opt for symbolic rather than substantive 
responses to stakeholders. Our study indicates that this might be a dangerous strategy. 
Symbolic actions regarding the natural environment may have short-term impact on legitimacy 
at best. We showed that investing greater efforts (e.g., more money or time) in signaling being 
green (that is, operating with consideration for the environment), rather than spending 
resources on environmentally sound practices, may have lower impact on the firm’s legitimacy.  
Thus, managers should realize that while certain symbolic actions may nullify stakeholders 
temporarily, sustainable stakeholder satisfaction is only achieved with substantive actions. This 
may be so because symbolic actions are easily copied by rivals. For instance, we found that 
transparency in communication had an impact on legitimacy. According to a study, the number 
of large publicly traded United States corporations that report on their sustainability efforts has 
increased significantly over the past three years; 86 percent of the S&P 100 companies now 
have corporate sustainability websites, compared with 58% in mid-2005. This means that 
disclosure on sustainability performance has become the norm for these firms, most likely 
because symbolic actions can be readily mimicked. Thus these actions have little potential to 
become a differential elements vis-à-vis rivals. Substantive environmental actions, on the other 
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hand, are more effective in gaining legitimacy sustainably and therefore constitute a base for a 
competitive advantage (Hart, 1995; Porter and van der Linde, 1995). 
Our results suggest that community communications may be important in gaining legitimacy at 
least in the short-term. Therefore, companies may need to dedicate some efforts in conveying 
the green message to society. However, this recommendation should be taken with caution 
because the effect is short-term and, moreover, some authors have suggested that enacting a 
wide variety of symbolic actions is more effective than only a limited set (Zott and Huy, 2007). 
But this does not to seem to be the case for environmental legitimacy. The message here is 
clear: more environmental symbolic actions do not mean a greener company. 
A company that merely adopts environmental behaviors in a symbolic manner decoupled from 
substantive actions may jeopardize their legitimacy as it may be perceived as deceitful. Yet our 
findings do not suggest that symbolic actions are entirely worthless. When properly balanced 
with more definitive environmental responses, symbolic actions are the perfect complement for 
substantive endeavors to boost legitimacy. Thus, effective management of environmental 
legitimacy implies a balance between symbolic and substantive actions. 
Caveats and Future Research 
An important limitation of this work is that we focus exclusively on publicly traded firms and thus 
we cannot speak about the effectiveness of symbolic and substantive environmental actions in 
privately held companies. It is likely that the limited impact of symbolic actions on legitimacy 
is because public companies are more exposed to public scrutiny. But this might not be the case for 
private companies and they may get away with symbolic actions. New studies could explore the 
extent to which our conclusions apply to less visible firms like private companies or other 
organizational forms such as family firms. More research on alternative settings like a non–United 
States context could also expand this line of inquiry. Moreover, given that legitimacy is socially 
constructed, it has several dimensions, but the results of this study are confined to environmental 
legitimacy. Future research could explore the effect of both symbolic and substantive actions on 
alternative dimensions of legitimacy like political or moral.  Another limitation is that we identified 
specific symbolic actions believed to be oriented towards specific stakeholders. However, some of 
these symbolic actions may go beyond the domain of a certain stakeholder. For instance, 
community communication may be oriented not only towards the community; it may also have an 
influence on other constituencies. Researchers could analyze the extent to which symbolic actions 
are oriented toward one or more stakeholders. Finally, we tested a reduced number of symbolic and 
substantive environmental actions. Others actions like ISO 14001 certification or environmental 
program training may also have an impact on environmental legitimacy, which are left for future 
research. 
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Appendix 1 
 Environmental Legitimacy Measure 
Environmental legitimacyit  = 2
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Where pt is the number of positive environmental articles in year t, nt is the number of negative 
environmental articles in year t and N is the total number of positive and negative 
environmental articles in year  t (Tt= pt + nt). 
 
Appendix 2 
Pollution Prevention Measure 
First, we obtained a weighted waste score for each facility as follows, 
kl
k l
kltjt fEww *∑∑= ,         
where kltE  is the emissions of chemical l to medium k in year t by facility j; and klf  is the 
weighting factor corresponding to chemical l emitted to medium k. 
Next we make a prediction of waste generation using the reported PR as in the next expression,   
11 *_Pr ++ ∑= jt
j
jtit PRwwwasteedicted       
Finally, we compute the difference between actual waste and predicted waste and aggregate at 
the parent firm level to obtain a firm measure of pollution prevention as we show next,    
Pollution preventionit+1 ∑∑ ++ −=
j
jtjt
j
jt wwPRww 11*      
where  j are the facilities that belong to firm i. 
If actual waste level is lower than the predicted level, formula 2 would yield positive values, 
evidencing reduction of waste generation. Thus, bigger values are associated with better PP 
performance. 
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Appendix 3 
Environmental Innovation Measure 
Environmental innovationit = itit Patentsw *    
with wit = 
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and where itPatents denotes total environmental patents of firm i granted during year t, 
itCitations  denotes all the citations received by the patents granted to firm i during year t and 
Nt  denotes the total number of firms in the sample for year t. 
 
